UEFA and the 2028 Reform Gamble: When National-Team Football Is Forced into a Swiss Mould

If you have ever sat in a technical meeting room at a youth training camp at 6 a.m., in the middle of a Munich winter, with GPS data still warm from the previous day's session, you will understand one thing: every reform in football begins with a number, and every number ends with a power negotiation that no journalist is allowed into. I remember the morning of November 2026 in Doha, when Jamal Musiala only came on in the second half of Germany's 1-2 defeat to Japan. I was sitting in row 14, in the temporary press area, noting every run he made in a notebook with a worn spine. But what kept me awake that night was not any shot. It was a sentence I heard from a UEFA official in a hotel corridor: "We do not have enough notable matches to sell to broadcasters." Four years later, that sentence has become a draft reform that the entire European football world is dissecting.

UEFA is preparing to change the entire structure of national-team competitions. Not just the Nations League. Not just the Euro or World Cup qualifiers. But a merged system, based on the Swiss model, expected to launch in 2028. A single ranking table, 36 national teams, each playing about 6 matches per cycle. Seeding by pot, strong teams meeting more often, matches with excessive margins limited. It sounds reasonable. But when an organisation says it is doing something for "product quality", I always want to open my notebook and check where the money is flowing.

This reform is essentially a negotiation over broadcasting rights dressed in the clothing of sporting innovation. And to understand it, we need to separate two stories running in parallel: UEFA's story, and FIFA's story. Two organisations, one calendar, and an election in 2027 approaching.

Before going into detail, let me set the context properly. I am not a writer who covers national teams like a beat reporter. I am a youth-football watcher, someone who sits for hours at Bayern Campus noting the number of touches by 16-year-olds. But precisely because I start from the bottom of the system, I see something that reporters covering senior national teams often miss: every change in the structure of top-level competitions has direct consequences for youth academies, and for the fate of children who do not yet know how to read a contract.

Let me explain.

Over 12 years of watching the industry, I have realised one thing: the calendar is not just a sheet of paper. It is a map of power. Every time someone cuts a day, extends a week, or merges two match windows, someone gains and someone loses. Young players are the first to lose. And this time, UEFA's reform is designed to expand the number of national-team matches. That sounds like good news for fans. But bad news for whom?

Look at the number 36.

36 teams in a single ranking table. This is the number UEFA has chosen for the expanded Nations League and for the merged Euro/World Cup qualifiers. In organisational terms, 36 is an interesting number. It is larger than 32 – the classic number of the old World Cup. It is smaller than 54 – the full membership of UEFA. And the gap between 36 and 54 is where the unanswered questions lie.

Imagine 54 European national football associations. Among them are associations like Germany, France, Spain, England, Italy – football nations with revenues in the hundreds of millions of euros. And there are associations like San Marino, Gibraltar, Liechtenstein – countries whose national teams play only a few matches a year. If UEFA merges everyone into a Swiss-model ranking system with 36 top teams, then the question is: where do the remaining 18 associations play?

The draft mentions a promotion and relegation mechanism. But the specifics are not yet available. This is the biggest gap in the reform at this stage. And this is not just a technical issue. It is a political one.

I once sat in a small press conference in Thessaloniki last September, when UEFA officials presented the reform idea to member associations. The hall was not full of journalists. I came for a different reason: I wanted to hear the tone of those representing small associations. And I heard what I expected. A representative of a small association raised his hand and asked: "If we are not among the top 36, do we still have a chance to play the big teams?" The answer from the podium was a general phrase about a "promotion mechanism". No numbers. No commitments. Just a promise that everything would be discussed further.

That was when I understood that this reform is not a football story. It is a money story.

Let me say plainly what officials do not say. National-team football, as a product, is having an audience-share problem. Euro qualifiers usually contain two types of matches: big matches drawing tens of millions of viewers, and small matches that even hardcore fans do not bother to turn on. Matches like Germany against San Marino, or France against Gibraltar, have very low viewing figures. But they still occupy a television slot, an advertising slot, a ticketing slot.

UEFA wants to reduce the number of these small matches and increase the number of big ones. That is simple commercial logic. And the Swiss model allows them to do it. In a single 36-team table, strong teams meet more often, because seeding is based on performance. First pot plays second pot, third pot plays fourth pot. This increases the number of "notable matches" – exactly what broadcasters want.

But this is where I want to stop and think carefully.

There is a truth that UEFA officials often hide in press conferences: the new competition does not make football fairer. It only makes football easier to sell.

I am not saying this to criticise UEFA. I am saying it because I have seen it from inside the system. When you work with data from a youth academy, you learn one thing: every change in the structure of top-level competitions seeps downwards. If national teams play more matches, clubs must release players more often. If clubs must release players more often, they will try to compensate by increasing domestic league matches. And if the domestic league increases matches, youth academies will be forced to push young players into the first team too early. That is the domino chain.

But let me return to the main story. UEFA is reforming because it wants money. And it is reforming at a particularly important moment.

Look at the calendar. FIFA has moved first. In its international match calendar reform, FIFA introduced a two-week window at the end of September, allowing national teams to play four matches instead of two. October was freed. The number of windows from the start of the season to the end of the year fell from three to two. This compresses the club calendar, leaving a break of only about 15 days.

Why did FIFA do this? Because FIFA and UEFA are competing for influence. And both have elections in 2027. UEFA's reform should therefore be read as a power-positioning move ahead of the next broadcasting-rights cycle and ahead of the election.

This is where the analysis becomes interesting. Because if you only read the press releases, you would think UEFA is doing this for the fans. But if you place the events side by side on a timeline, you see a different story.

Event one: the Champions League is an important revenue source for UEFA. This is something UEFA itself admits. Event two: broadcasters pay most of the broadcasting-rights money for the number of notable matches. Event three: UEFA believes the current number of notable national-team matches is insufficient to meet broadcaster demand. Event four: FIFA and UEFA elections take place in 2027.

When you place these four events side by side, you see a clear pattern. UEFA is trying to replicate the commercial success of the Champions League at national-team level. And it is doing so at the moment when it most needs to strengthen its political position.

But there is a problem. National-team football is not club football. And the Swiss model, which works well in the Champions League, may not work well at national-team level. Why?

Let me explain with data.

In club football, teams play each other regularly. They have a chance to correct mistakes. If Bayern loses one Champions League group match, they still have five more to fix things. Players train together daily. They have time to adjust tactics, to understand each other, to build an identity.

In national-team football, teams meet only a few times a year. Each match window is a short gathering. Players come from different clubs, with different tactical systems. They have little time to train together. And each match matters far more than a Champions League group game.

The Swiss model in the Champions League works because it allows big teams more matches against peers. But at national-team level, this may create another problem: small teams will have fewer chances to play bigger teams, and therefore fewer chances to develop.

Let me give a concrete example.

In 2026, Iceland reached the Euro quarter-finals. It was one of the greatest fairy tales in European football. Iceland is a country of just over 300,000 people. They did not have a powerful football tradition. But they beat England in the round of 16. They did it thanks to a golden generation and a youth-development system built methodically over many years.

If the Swiss model had been applied in 2026, would Iceland have had a chance to do that? The answer is uncertain. Because in a 36-team ranking system, Iceland – as a low-ranked team – would have fewer chances to play top teams. They would be locked in a lower seeding pot, facing peers, and would struggle to accumulate points to climb.

This is one of the biggest blind spots of the reform. And it is not something UEFA officials want to talk about.

I remember once, in 2026, when I was a data assistant at Bayern Campus, I had a conversation with a youth coach. He told me something I have never forgotten: "In youth football, the most important thing is not how many matches you win. The most important thing is who you get to play."

That applies to national-team football too. Small teams need chances to play big teams in order to develop. They need hard matches to learn. They need painful defeats to grow. If you remove those chances from them, you do not make football fairer. You make it more closed.

This is why I believe UEFA's reform, though presented as a step forward in quality, is in fact a step backward in opportunity.

But let me be fair. There are arguments in favour of the reform.

Argument one: matches with excessive margins are a real problem. Nobody wants to watch Germany beat San Marino 8-0. Such matches bring no sporting value, no commercial value, and no emotional value. Reducing the number of such matches is a reasonable idea.

Argument two: strong teams meeting more often is good for fans. Matches like Germany against France, Spain against Italy, or England against the Netherlands always attract huge attention. Increasing the number of such matches could raise the quality of the national-team product.

Argument three: the Swiss model has proven effective in the Champions League. It makes the group stage more attractive, with more meaningful matches. There is no reason it cannot work at national-team level.

I understand these arguments. But I do not fully agree with them.

The problem lies here: the Champions League and national-team football have completely different incentive structures. The Champions League is a competition of wealthy clubs. National-team football is a system that includes small nations. When you apply a model from one system to the other, you are not just transferring a format. You are transferring power.

To understand better, look at the number 17%.

That is the proportion of Bayern Munich U15 players in the 2026-2026 cohort who reached the first team. I spent many months collecting and analysing this data. Out of hundreds of young players trained at one of Europe's best academies, only 17% reached the first team. This shows a harsh truth: even in the best systems, the success rate is very low.

But here is the interesting part. When I analysed deeper, I realised that the success rate does not depend on the player's talent. It depends on opportunity. Players given earlier first-team chances, involved in more competitive matches, had a significantly higher success rate.

This applies to national-team football too. Small countries need chances to play big teams in order to develop. If you remove that chance, you do not just harm them. You harm the entire European football system.

Let me give another example.

In 2026, Denmark won the European Championship. They were not even originally qualified. They were called in to replace Yugoslavia, which had been excluded for political reasons. Denmark arrived late, without good preparation, but they won. It is one of the greatest stories in European football.

If the Swiss model had been applied in 2026, would Denmark have had a chance to do that? Possibly not. Because in a ranking system, Denmark would have had to go through more rounds to get a chance to meet the big teams. And they would have had fewer chances to create a fairy tale.

I am not saying fairy tales would disappear completely. But they would become less likely. And that is a loss for football.

Now let me talk about an aspect few mention: the impact of this reform on youth football.

As I mentioned above, every change in the structure of top-level competitions seeps downwards. If national teams play more matches, clubs must release players more often. This means young players will be called into first teams earlier, often before they are physically and psychologically ready.

I have seen this happen. In 2026, during the Covid-19 lockdown, I monitored Paul Wanner – a 14-year-old – via Zoom. The boy trained in his family's living room, maintaining 92% of his sprint speed compared to normal. That was an astonishing achievement for a child of that age. But it also showed one thing: the pressure on young players is growing. They are expected to be ready earlier, to endure more, to grow up faster.

If UEFA's reform increases the number of national-team matches, this pressure will grow further. Young players will be called into national teams earlier. They will have to play more matches in less time. And they will have less time to develop naturally.

This is one of the consequences the reform draft does not mention. And it is one of the most serious.

But let me talk about another aspect I care about: the promotion and relegation mechanism.

The draft mentions this mechanism, but there are no specific details. This is a major gap. Because the promotion and relegation mechanism is the decisive factor in the fairness of the system. If it is well designed, it can protect the interests of small countries. If it is poorly designed, it can create a closed system where big teams always stay on top and small teams never get a chance to rise.

Let me make a comparison. In the current Champions League system, there is a clear mechanism for teams from small leagues: they must go through qualifying rounds to reach the group stage. This creates a path, however difficult, for small teams. They can dream of reaching the group stage, and from there, of going further.

If the Swiss model at national-team level does not have a similar mechanism, it will create a two-tier system: one tier for big teams, and one tier for small teams. The upper tier will be rich and attractive. The lower tier will be poor and forgotten.

This is what small associations fear. And they have reason to fear it.

But let me return to the main story: money.

This reform is, in essence, a negotiation over how to divide broadcasting revenue. And in every negotiation over money, the loudest voice belongs to the one with the most money.

Big national teams – Germany, France, Spain, England, Italy – have the greatest commercial power. They attract the most viewers, sell the most tickets, and therefore are paid the most by broadcasters. They will be the main beneficiaries of this reform.

Small national teams – Iceland, Albania, North Macedonia – have the least commercial power. They attract fewer viewers, sell fewer tickets, and therefore are paid less. They will be the main losers in this reform.

This is an uncomfortable truth. But it is the truth.

I remember a conversation with an official from a small association in 2026. He told me: "We understand we cannot compete with big teams commercially. But we need a chance to compete sportingly. If they remove that chance, they will kill football in our country."

These words haunt me. Because they point to a truth many forget: football is not just a commercial product. It is part of cultural identity. It is part of community. It is part of hope.

When you take away a small country's chance to play a big country, you are not just taking away a match. You are taking away a dream.

But let me be fair once more. UEFA is not an evil organisation. They are trying to solve a real problem: imbalance in national-team football. Big teams often beat small teams by wide margins. This is not good for football. And UEFA is trying to find a way to solve that problem.

The problem is how they choose to solve it.

Instead of finding ways to help small teams develop – through investment in youth training, through fairer revenue sharing, through technical support – UEFA chooses to group big teams together. This is an exclusionary approach. It does not solve the root problem. It only hides it.

Let me explain this with a comparison.

Imagine a school system. In this system, some students are better than others. One way to address this is to separate the good students into their own class, where they can study together at a higher level. This is the Swiss model. Another way is to keep all students in the same class, but provide extra support to weaker students. This is the traditional model.

Both approaches have pros and cons. The Swiss model allows good students to develop faster. The traditional model allows weaker students to be better supported. The question is: what is the goal of the system?

If the goal is to maximise the achievement of the best students, the Swiss model is the better choice. If the goal is to raise the level of all students, the traditional model is the better choice.

In football, UEFA's goal – at least as they claim – is to raise the quality of European football as a whole. If that is true, the Swiss model may not be the best choice.

But if UEFA's real goal is to maximise broadcasting revenue, then the Swiss model is a reasonable choice.

This is the question I want to put to UEFA officials: What is your real goal?

I know the answer will be "both". But in football, as in life, you cannot have everything. You must choose.

And this reform shows UEFA is choosing money.

Now let me talk about another aspect of the reform: its impact on the club calendar.

As I mentioned, FIFA moved first. They introduced a two-week window at the end of September, allowing national teams to play four matches instead of two. October was freed. The number of windows from the start of the season to the end of the year fell from three to two. This compresses the club calendar, leaving a break of only about 15 days.

This is an important change. It means clubs will have to play more matches in less time. And it means players will have to endure greater physical pressure.

I have seen the impact of this pressure in the GPS data of young players at Bayern Campus. Players who play many matches in a row have higher injury rates. Players who get adequate rest have higher performance. This is a basic rule of sports physiology.

If UEFA's reform increases the number of national-team matches, it will increase pressure on players. And this will lead to more injuries, more surgeries, and more careers cut short.

This is one of the hidden costs of the reform. And it is a cost UEFA officials do not want to talk about.

Let me give a concrete example of the impact of a congested calendar.

In 2026, I monitored the case of Aleksandar Pavlović – a young Bayern Munich midfielder. He had just been called into the Germany squad for Euro 2026. But three days before the training camp, he had a fever of 39.6°C due to tonsillitis. I stayed silent about this information, refusing to exploit it as a hot story. But this story shows one thing: young players are facing growing pressure to be ready for major tournaments.

If the calendar becomes denser, this pressure will grow further. And this will have serious consequences for young players' health and careers.

This is why I believe UEFA's reform needs to be examined carefully, not only from a commercial perspective, but also from the perspective of player health and welfare.

"47 days of isolation is enough for a thesis to take shape, but not enough for a person to grow up." I wrote this sentence in my master's thesis on remote movement-monitoring protocols. It alludes to a reality: the development of young players takes time. You cannot accelerate that process without consequences.

UEFA's reform, if not carefully designed, could accelerate this process. And that could have consequences we cannot yet foresee.

But let me talk about another aspect. There is a question few ask: Will UEFA's reform actually happen?

This is an important question. Because this reform is still only in the design phase. It needs approval from UEFA's member associations. And small associations may oppose it.

I have heard rumours of discontent among small associations. They fear the reform will reduce their chances. They fear they will be pushed to the margins of European football.

If enough small associations oppose it, the reform could stall. Or it could be modified to better protect their interests.

This is why the Thessaloniki meeting matters. It is a step in the negotiation process. And its outcome will depend on the balance of power between big and small associations.

I will monitor this process carefully. Because, as I said, every change in the structure of top-level competitions has consequences for youth football. And youth football is the future of football.

"There are pieces of data that lie dormant for years, waiting for someone who knows how to assemble them." This is one of my most cherished sentences. It reminds me that in every story, there are details that get overlooked. These details can completely change how we understand the story.

In the case of UEFA's reform, the overlooked pieces of data are:

First, no simulation data has been published to prove that the Swiss model will actually make matches more competitive. UEFA only claims this, without providing evidence.

Second, there are no specific details about the promotion and relegation mechanism. This means we do not know whether small countries will have a chance to rise.

Third, there is no information about how broadcasting revenue will be divided. This means we do not know whether small countries will receive a fair share.

These pieces of data matter. They matter because they determine whether this reform is truly for the benefit of European football, or only for the benefit of a few big countries.

"That autumn did not answer, but it kept all the questions." I wrote this sentence when thinking about the autumn of 2026, when I began recording data on Oliver Batista Meier at Bayern Campus. He was an astonishing talent. In one U17 match, he had 214 touches and 11 successful dribbles out of 13. These numbers showed enormous potential.

But he did not succeed in elite football. He was loaned out and soon left elite football.

I did not delete his dataset. The numbers are still there, waiting for someone to read them. And they tell a story about the complexity of developing young talent.

What does Oliver Batista Meier's story have to do with UEFA's reform? It does. Because it shows that talent is not the only factor determining success. Opportunity, environment, and support systems matter just as much.

Small countries in European football are like young talents such as Oliver Batista Meier. They have potential. They have passion. But they need chances to develop. If UEFA's reform removes that chance, they will never reach their potential.

This is why I am concerned about this reform. Not because I am against innovation. But because I care about those who may be left behind.

Now let me talk about an aspect I have not yet mentioned: FIFA's role.

FIFA and UEFA have a complex relationship. They cooperate in many areas, but also compete in many others. UEFA's reform needs to be examined in the context of this relationship.

FIFA moved first in the race to reform the international calendar. They changed the structure of match windows, with a two-week window at the end of September and the freeing of October. This is an important move, because it gives FIFA more control over the international calendar.

UEFA is responding to this move with its own reform. This is part of the influence competition between the two organisations.

The 2027 election is an important factor in this competition. Both FIFA and UEFA will hold leadership elections. Candidates will need to prove they can deliver benefits to member associations. And this reform is part of that effort.

This is why I believe this reform will happen in some form. Not because it is a good idea. But because it is a political tool.

But its form will depend on the outcome of the negotiation. And this negotiation has only just begun.

Let me summarise the main points of this analysis.

UEFA's reform is an effort to increase broadcasting revenue by increasing the number of notable matches. It is based on the Swiss model, with 36 teams in a single ranking table and each team playing about 6 matches.

The reform has potential benefits: reducing the number of matches with large margins, increasing the number of matches between strong teams, and creating a more attractive system for fans.

But it also carries risks: reducing opportunities for small countries, increasing pressure on players, and creating a two-tier system in European football.

This reform needs to be examined carefully, not only from a commercial perspective, but also from a sporting and social perspective. Because football is not just a product. It is part of European identity.

"People see a defender; I see a sedimentary layer of the system." I wrote this sentence when thinking about how we perceive football. Most people see what happens on the pitch. I see what happens behind the pitch.

UEFA's reform is an example of what happens behind the pitch. It is a complex process involving many factors: commercial, political, sporting, and social. To understand it, we need to look at all these factors.

I will continue to monitor this process. And I will continue to write about it. Because I believe fans need to understand what is happening in football. Not only what happens on the pitch, but also what happens in the meeting room.

Because what happens in the meeting room will shape what happens on the pitch for years to come.

And when I look at this reform, I see an unanswered question: Will European football become fairer, or merely easier to sell?

This is the question I want to put to UEFA's leaders. And this is the question I will keep seeking to answer.

"Youth teams have no destiny, only crossroads covered in dust." I wrote this sentence when thinking about the young players I have monitored over the years. They have no predetermined path. They have choices, and each choice leads to a different path.

Small countries in European football are the same. They have no predetermined destiny. They have choices. And UEFA's reform is one of those choices.

If the reform is well designed, it could open new paths for small countries. If it is poorly designed, it could close those paths.

This is why I care about the details of the reform. Not because I enjoy analysing organisational structures. But because I care about the people affected by them.

And in this case, those affected most are small countries and young players.

They are the ones I want to protect. Not by writing sensational articles, but by writing careful, data-based, fair analysis.

That is how I work. And that is how I will continue to work.

"Qatar taught me that there are black holes that do not swallow light, but swallow youth." I wrote this sentence after the 2026 World Cup, when I witnessed Germany eliminated in the group stage. It was a painful defeat. But it was also a lesson.

The lesson: systems can swallow talent. If a system is not designed to nurture talent, it will destroy talent. This is what I wrote in the article "The 2026-2026 Black Hole", when I analysed data showing that only 17% of Bayern Munich U15 players in the 2026-2026 cohort reached the first team.

UEFA's reform could create a new black hole. A black hole swallowing the opportunities of small countries. A black hole swallowing the dreams of young players.

This is what worries me most. Not the technical changes. But the human consequences.

But I am not a pessimist. I believe that if we understand the risks clearly, we can find ways to mitigate them. If we understand the consequences clearly, we can find ways to prevent them.

This is why I write this article. Not to criticise UEFA. But to provide a different perspective, one based on data and experience.

I hope UEFA's leaders will read this. And I hope they will consider my concerns.

Because in the end, we all want the same thing: a strong, fair, and attractive European football.

The question is only how to achieve it.

And that is a question we need to answer together.

"A season passes, but the numbers never go away." I wrote this sentence when thinking about how data endures through time. The numbers I recorded in 2026 are still there. The numbers I analysed in 2026 are still there. And the numbers about this reform will still be there for years to come.

These numbers tell a story. And that story is: European football is changing. But changing for whom, and changing how, are questions we need to answer.

I will continue to monitor this reform. I will continue to record data. I will continue to analyse data. And I will continue to write about what I find.

Because that is my job. Not the job of a reporter chasing hot news. But the job of a data archaeologist, digging into football's sedimentary layers to find the truth.

And the truth, in this case, is: UEFA's reform is not just a technical change. It is a change in power. And how we respond to it will shape the future of European football for decades to come.

That is the weight of this decision. And that is why we need to examine it carefully.